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Public funding of elections increases candidate polarization
by reducing the influence of moderate donors.
A common refrain is that there is “too much money in politics”, with many arguing for the public
funding of political campaigns. But what are the effects of this kind of public finding on electoral
and legislative behavior? Using evidence from U.S. state legislative elections over the past four
decades, Andrew B. Hall finds that public funding for campaigns actually increases political
polarization by reducing the influence of interest groups, which tend to be more moderate than
individuals in the way that they donate.
In his 1907 State of  the Union address, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt told the nation
that “there is a very radical measure which would, I believe, work a substantial improvement in our system of
conducting a campaign.”  He was ref erring to the public f unding of  polit ical campaigns, a ref orm that, more
than 100 years later, is enjoying resurgent popularity in America.  In addition to the f ederal government’s
f unding of  presidential elections, f ourteen U.S. states now of f er some kind of  public f unding to candidates
f or state of f ices, and similar programs have been proposed f or the U.S. House and Senate.
By looking at the ef f ects of  the public f unding of  campaigns on electoral and legislative behavior, we can
not only evaluate an important policy, but we can learn about the polit ical ef f ects of  the design of  our
electoral institutions and enhance our theoretical understanding of  the links between campaign f inance,
interest groups, and the actions of  our legislators.
In recent research, I f ind that the public f unding of  state legislative elections deprives incumbents of  their
f inancial and electoral advantages but increases legislative polarization.  I present evidence that this
increase in polarization stems, at least in part, f rom the way in which public f unding reduces the inf luence
of  access-oriented interest groups, donors who pref er more moderate candidates.
To arrive at these results, I take advantage of  the staggered implementation of  public f unding programs in
f ive states: Minnesota and Wisconsin, who implemented programs in the 1970s, and Arizona, Maine, and
Connecticut, whose more stringent “clean election programs” are of  more recent vintage.  The programs
work by providing state f unds to legislative candidates who “opt in” and obtain a small number of  qualif ying
donations f rom individuals to establish their viability. By comparing the way these states have changed
af ter implementing public f unding to how all other “control” states have changed over the same time period,
I was able to disentangle how public f unding af f ects elections and legislation.
Figure 1 shows my main results, and plots the distribution of  state legislative ideal points or “NP Scores”
(which show levels of  polarization), estimated f rom roll-call data by Shor and McCarty f or “treated” states,
those that implement public f unding programs, and “control” states, those that do not.  In the top row, we
can see how the distribution of  ideal points has become more polarized to the lef t and right af ter public
f unding, with f ewer legislators in the middle of  the spectrum and two “humps” f or the two parties.  No such
change is seen over the same time period in the control states in the second row.
Figure 1 – Changes in roll-call polarization across treated and control states:  U.S. state
legislatures, 1993- 2010
Why does public f unding increase polarization?  In my research, I f ocus on one major explanation, although
there may be others as well.  Public f unding removes the ability of  access-oriented interest groups to
target incumbents with their contributions.  As Adam Bonica has shown, these groups tend to be more
moderate than individuals in their donation behavior.
Figure 2 conf irms this relationship f or state legislatures.  The plots show the average amount of  money
donated to candidates f rom access-oriented interest groups (in the f irst plot) and individuals (in the
second plot) across candidate NP Scores.  The f irst plot shows that access groups display a strong
pref erence f or candidates with ideological scores in the middle of  the spectrum; individuals, on the other
hand, display no such pref erence, as the second plot shows.
Figure 2 – Donation patterns in state legislatures
Note: The left panel presents a kernel smoother relating candidate roll-call ideology (NP
score) to residualized total contributions from access-oriented groups (de-meaned by state
and party). The right panel presents the same for residualized total contributions from
individuals. Because of sparsity, the graphs exclude the 4.8% of observations with NP
scores less than -1.5 or greater than 1.5.
This dynamic can be seen clearly if  we zoom in on Connecticut’s public f unding program.  Figure 3 plots the
“ideological portf olios” of  state legislative candidates bef ore and af ter public f unding in Connecticut, using
a technique described in the paper.
Figure 3 – Ideological donor portfolios of Connecticut state legislative candidates over t ime
Note: Plots the average estimated ideology of donors to candidates. Each line represents a
candidate’s portfolio over time. Dark, bold lines are the party averages. A value of 1 indicates
that the candidate’s entire portfolio came from donors that only gave to Republicans; a value
of -1 indicates that the candidate’s entire port- folio came from donors that only gave to
Democrats. The vertical dotted line indicates the last election before public funding.
As the plot shows, both Republicans and Democrats moved to the extremes af ter public f unding was put in
place in 2006.  In 2008, every Republican candidate in the dataset received donations only f rom donors who
contributed exclusively to Republicans, and every Democratic candidate in the dataset received donations
only f rom donors who contributed exclusively to Democrats.  (These donations are, in almost all cases,
qualif ying donations f rom individual donors who support one party exclusively.)
Public f unding programs diminish the inf luence of  these moderate interest groups, who are f ree only to
contribute to candidates who do not “opt in” to public f unding.  While opt- in rates vary widely across states
and years, they are of ten high enough to wipe out interest group contributions, leaving candidates to cater
to individual voters and the small number of  individual donors they must woo in order to qualif y f or public
f unds.
The link I have shown between campaign f inance ref orms that limit interest group donation behavior and
polarization is consistent with other research on the topic.  In a comprehensive study of  other types of
campaign f inance ref orm, Michael Barber has shown the same exact pattern of  polarizing ef f ects, as have
Michael Miller and Seth Masket in their early study of  public f unding (see discussion here and here).
What do we make of  these f indings? From a policy perspective, the results require cautious interpretation. 
Although public f unding increases legislative polarization, it might improve many other f eatures of  the
polit ical system.  Perhaps the best evidence f or many of  these benef its is presented in Michael Miller ’s
comprehensive study of  the subject, Subsidizing Democracy.  Among other things, the book shows that
publicly f unded legislators have more time to dedicate to usef ul activit ies, rather than to f undraising. 
Voters, too, seem to become more engaged af ter public f unding is put in place.  In addition, it is possible
that incumbents in publicly f unded legislatures are less beholden to “special interests,” although observing
this is dif f icult if  not impossible.
Caution is also required because the policy implications of  the f indings f or public f unding depend on opt- in
rates.  My estimates are all at the aggregate level to avoid selecting on the strategic decisions of
candidates to opt into the program or not.  If  opt- in rates f all much—and it appears they are f alling in some
states, such as in Arizona, where participation went well below 40% in 2012—then it seems likely that the
electoral and legislative ef f ects of  public f unding I have uncovered will diminish as more and more
candidates receive more money f rom interest groups again.
In some respects the broader theoretical implications of  the f indings are clearer than their policy
implications.  Access-oriented groups use campaign contributions to support incumbents.  Their
contributions f orm a large part of  incumbents’ f inancial advantage, and ref orms that prevent them f rom
doing so leave incumbents worse of f , electorally.  The loss of  this f inancial support also produces more
polarized legislators, suggesting that access groups act as a buf f er against the polarized pref erences of
individuals.
What do access-oriented interest groups receive in exchange f or these contributions?  Answering this
question, something of  a “holy grail” f or the study of  interest groups, is vital to understanding the
tradeof f s between a world with publicly f inanced elections and one in which any group is f ree to contribute
to any candidate.   Whatever the answer to this question, my analysis of  public f unding programs
demonstrates the role that access-oriented groups play in supporting moderate incumbents electorally.
This article is based on the working paper How The Public Funding Of Elections Increases Candidate
Polarization.
Featured image credit: Truthout.org (Creative Commons BY NC SA)
Please read our comments policy before commenting. 
Note:  This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of USApp– American Politics and Policy,
nor of the London School of Economics. 
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/1mUjhkN
 _________________________________
About the author
Andrew B. Hall – Harvard University
Andrew B. Hall is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of  Government at Harvard University
and an af f iliate of  the Institute f or Quantitative Social Science. Hall’s work appears in, or is
f orthcoming in, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Polit ics, and
Legislative Studies Quarterly.  His applied research studies the links between American
electoral institutions and the behavior of  elected of f icials in the legislature.  For more
inf ormation, please see andrewbenjaminhall.com.  You can f ollow Andrew on
Twitter @andrewbhall.
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 2014 LSE USAPP

